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ABSTRACT
Internet of Things (IoT) and Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) are composed of devices capable of sensing/actuation,
communication and processing. They are valuable technology for the development of applications in several
areas, such as environmental, industrial and urban monitoring and processes controlling. Given the challenges of
different protocols and technologies used for communication, resource constrained devices nature, high connectivity
and security requirements for the applications, the main challenges that need to be addressed include: secure
communication between IoT devices, network resource management and the protected implementation of the
security mechanisms. In this paper, we present a secure Software-Defined Networking (SDN) based framework that
includes: communication protocols, node task programming middleware, communication and computation resource
management features and security services. The communication layer for the constrained devices considers IT-SDN
as its basis. Concerning security, we address the main services, the type of algorithms to achieve them, and why
their secure implementation is needed. Lastly, we showcase how the Sensing as a Service paradigm could enable
WSN usage in more environments.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Research on Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) started
about 20 years ago, pushed by the development in
the microelectronics industry as well as advances in
wireless communications. Furthermore, the ability to
This paper is accepted at the International Workshop on Very
Large Internet of Things (VLIoT 2017) in conjunction with the
VLDB 2017 Conference in Munich, Germany. The proceedings of
VLIoT@VLDB 2017 are published in the Open Journal of Internet
of Things (OJIOT) as special issue.
collect data with increased spacial and temporal density
increased the knowledge on events being monitored,
which interested researchers and users of this collected
data.
WSN has been used to support several different
applications, mainly related to monitoring, detection
and tracking. WSN nodes are typically battery-
powered, resource constrained (i.e. limited amount of
memory, processing capacity, bandwidth and range), and
communicate through a multihop ad hoc network [6].
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Routing protocols for WSN evolved over time. Initially
most of the deployments had specific purposes and used
routing algorithms tailored for their needs. For instance,
directed diffusion was designed for event and interest
based networks [15], while Collection Tree Protocol
(CTP) is adequate for a traffic pattern from nodes to
sink [11].
Considering the need to integrate Low power
and Lossy Networks (LLN) to the Internet, Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF) formed working groups.
IPv6 over Low power Wireless Personal Area Networks
(6LoWPAN) was specified (RFC 4944) and approaches
to achieve header compression (RFC 6282) and neighbor
discovery optimizations (RFC 6775) were also proposed.
Considered a typical link layer for LLN, IEEE 802.15.4
standard was the main reference. While other link layer
standards are being considered nowadays, such as the
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE), their limited bandwidth
and frame sizes still pose a challenge to the transmission
of large packets. In these scenarios, it is also necessary to
define routing mechanisms. RPL (IPv6 Routing Protocol
for Low-Power and Lossy Networks - RFC 6550) is the
protocol proposed to address such needs.
Software-defined networking (SDN) is an approach
to manage networks that separates the control plane
from the data plane. The routing/forwarding decisions
are made by the SDN controller based on network
information received. Openflow [24] was the first
protocol proposed to establish the communication
between forwarding nodes and the SDN controller.
Software Defined Wireless Sensor Networks (SDWSN)
approaches are also presented in the literature [18], and
we highlight SDN-Wise and TinySDN.
Despite all this proposals, WSN has not been widely
deployed or used. We believe this has three main
reasons: (1) challenges concerning resource constrains;
(2) lack of integration of mechanisms proposed (MAC
layer, routing, programming, management, security); (3)
dedicated infrastructure for each WSN application.
Security for IoT and WSN is a major concern
nowadays. These resource constrained devices usually
do not implement security mechanisms to protect
themselves and the data they collect and exchange.
The hyper-connectivity of IoT is currently threatened
by malicious and hostile entities that could perform
remote attacks. Security incidents whose target is
the IoT ecosystem are daily reported. The US-CERT
Alert (TA16-288A) - Heightened DDoS Threat Posed
by Mirai and Other Botnets, which was originally
released on October 2016, describes how IoT devices
were used to create large-scale botnets used to execute
denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. Therefore, security
mechanisms with secure implementations should be
carefully designed and deployed for IoT devices and
networks.
Despite the problems faced by IoT devices recently,
research on security algorithms for WSN and IoT has
been discussed. Symmetric encryption algorithms can
be executed in resource constrained devices [23, 31]
without incurring in much overhead. iSMQV [16] and
AdC [26] are proposals that address key exchange for
IoT and constrained devices. Flauzac et al. [9] argue
that security could be supported through SDN. Since
the SDN controller knows the network topology, this
information could be used to support node admission
decisions, using an approach similar to the capacity
sharing proposal [29]. Once nodes are admitted to an
SDN domain, a key exchange or distribution mechanism
could be used to support security services, such as data
confidentiality, integrity and authenticity.
Our approach to increasing WSN usage is to
coordinate all these efforts to enable the use of
WSN infrastructure by multiple different applications
and non technical users, implementing Sensing as a
Service. To achieve this, we propose an SDN-based
framework that includes communication protocols, node
task programming, resource management and security
services.
Thus, the main contribution in this paper is the
design of a secure SDN-based framework. While
some of the building blocks for our framework have
already been designed and developed, the integration
of such blocks is new, as well as the addition of the
security mechanisms. Our framework relies on IT-
SDN [1] to achieve SDWSN functionalities. It should
provide confidentiality, authenticity and integrity to
the control messages being exchanged. Furthermore,
only authenticated nodes should have access to the
communication infrastructure. Also, the algorithms
selected should be quantum-resistant and should be
securely implemented.
Notice that the term Sensing as a Service was also
used by Sheng et al. [30]. In their work, they
consider sensors on, or attached to, mobile phones
collecting data through a cloud computing system.
The focus on their vision paper is the requirements
and challenges to implement such systems. Since
they focus on mobile phones, most of their suggested
future research directions are not applicable to WSN
scenarios. Furthermore, security issues are not directly
addressed. However, we seek common goals such as
energy efficiency and a general reusable framework.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews
background and related work. Our framework to support
secure Sensing as a Service is presented in Section 3, and
its implementation is discussed in Section 4. Section 5
presents some use case scenarios. Lastly, Section 6
presents final considerations and future work.
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2 RELATED WORK
This section covers two main aspects: Software-Defined
WSN and security approaches for WSN.
2.1 The SDN Approach in WSN
Applying the SDN (Software-Defined Networking)
paradigm to WSN (Wireless Sensor Networks) imposes
different challenges and requirements when compared
to wired networks. The limited resources available
on the devices (i.e., energy, processing, memory,
bandwidth and payload size) are related to the main
challenges. The requirements are related to the
applications characteristics (e.g. sensing rate, data size,
data transmission pattern and aggregation), as well to
the nodes behavior due to duty-cycles, operating systems
and programming approach.
On the other hand, opportunities provided by SDWSN
(Software Defined Wireless Sensor Networks) include:
to improve resource reuse, to implement node retasking,
to establish and improve node and network management,
as well as to enable experiments with new protocols
and to ease transition to standard protocols for deployed
networks [7]. Notice that these features are key to
achieve the Sensing as a Service paradigm [22]. Several
SDWSN approaches are presented in the literature [18].
The ones based on OpenFlow [20, 21] have issues
concerning frame sizes, overhead introduced and the use
of TCP as underlying communication protocol.
TinySDN [8] is a flow-ID-based approach that
improves on previous work by enabling the use of
multiple SDN controllers and by addressing (i) in-band
control (i.e., control and data packets share the same
bandwidth); (ii) higher communication latency; (iii)
smaller link layer frames; and (iv) limited energy supply.
TinySDN provides the code and related documentation,
but it is highly dependent on TinyOS [13], thus limiting
the platforms it could be deployed. Furthermore the
use of the ActiveMessage function limits interoperability
with other systems.
SDN-WISE [10] defines mechanisms for a stateful
Flow Table, pursuing two goals: (i) to reduce the amount
of information exchanged between sensor nodes and
the SDN network controller, and (ii) to make sensor
nodes programmable as finite state machines. SDN-Wise
implementation is not completely available for download
and use. Given the limitations of the approaches
available on the literature, we recently introduced IT-
SDN [1]. IT-SDN is an SDWSN tool that is completely
open and available, unlike SDN-Wise. While its
design is inspired by TinySDN [8], we improved the
architecture, protocols and implementation.
None of the aforementioned SDWSN frameworks
include security services for the control or data plane.
2.2 Security in WSN
Several WSNs applications require security services,
such as confidentiality, integrity and authenticity. Given
the resource constrained requirements of WSNs, several
specific security architectures based on symmetric
cryptography were proposed, such as TinySec [17],
Minisec [19], ContikiSec [3], and WSNSec2012 [2].
Also the IEEE 802.15.4 standard includes operation
modes to provide security services on the link
layer [14]. All these proposals focus on hop-by-
hop security, since they were designed/implemented to
operate at the link and/or network layer. Unfortunately
they cannot guarantee end-to-end security, which is
addressed by WSN-ETESec [27]. Furthermore, most
of these architectures were designed and implemented
for specific hardware platforms and operating systems,
preventing its wide adoption.
An important issue to the effectiveness of these
architectures is how secret keys are distributed. Key
establishment approaches for WSNs must satisfy
several security and functional requirements, which
are often conflicting, such as resilience, authentication,
connectivity and reduced memory usage.
Solutions for key distribution in WSNs are classified
into three categories: pre-distribution, arbitrated, and
self-enforcing [33]. Pre-distribution keying approach
involves loading keys into sensor nodes prior to
deployment. Arbitrated protocols use more powerful
nodes to execute complex tasks, while self-enforcing
is the dynamic establishment of keys using, generally,
asymmetric cryptography.
Authentication of Things (AoT) [26] is a suite
of protocols that incorporate authentication and
access control designed for IoT. Primarily, AoT relies
on Identity- and Attribute-Based Cryptography to
cryptographically enforce Attribute-Based Access
Control (ABAC).
iSMQV [16] is a combination of SMQV
(strengthened-Menezes-Qu-Vanstone) with implicit
certificates, which leads to a secure, lightweight,
and escrow-free authenticated key agreement (AKA)
protocol. This protocol is used for bootstrapping keys
between authorized nodes, avoiding the transmission of
quite large certificates and the execution of memory-
and processing-intensive cryptographic algorithms,
which are not suitable for WSNs. Escrow-free is an
important property, since key-escrow enables a fully
trusted authority to know the private keys of all nodes.
IETF Authentication and Authorization for
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Constrained Environments (ace) working group1
proposed a standard for an architecture for authorization
in constrained environments, and then proposed a
standard named Authentication and Authorization for
Constrained Environments, which uses as building
blocks OAuth 2.0 (RFC6749) and CoAP (RFC 7252).
Notice that these proposals focus on the application
layer, and thus consider the use of the Transport Layer
Security (TLS) protocol (RFC 5246). TLS considers
the following key exchange algorithms: RSA, Digital
Signature Standard (DSS - FIPS 186) and Elliptic Curve
Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). Therefore, these
approaches are not comparable to the ones previously
described, since they rely on certificates.
3 SSAAS FRAMEWORK
As discussed in the Introduction, the Sensing as a
Service paradigm could increase WSN usage, since
it would enable the use of WSN infrastructure by
multiple different applications and non technical users.
To achieve this, we propose a secure SDN-based
framework that includes communication protocols, node
task programming, resource management and security
services. Next we present an overview of the Secure
Sensing as a Service (SSaaS) framework, and its
requirements.
3.1 Overview
An overview of the SSaaS framework is depicted in
Figure 1.
The SSaaS manager orchestrates the SDN controller,
the application controller, and the security controller,
along with the resource and topology information
obtained by them.
The SDN controller receives information from the
SDN devices regarding neighbor information (according
to the specified neighbor discovery protocol), and builds
a global topology map. Based on this, it will be able
to proactively set routes (or flows) or reply to route (or
flow) requests from the SDN devices.
The application controller provides an interface to
the user, so that he/she can select the WSN it would
like to program, and the corresponding tasks. The task
programming includes selecting: what sensors to use
(e.g. temperature, light, accelerometer), sensing rate,
data transmission rate, WSN sink address, duration of
the task (e.g., once, one hour, one day, always). The
application controller makes use of a middleware (such
as WARM [32]) to send the information to the WSN
node. The middleware is also responsible to collect
1 https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/ace/
documents/
Figure 1: Sensing as a Service (SSaaS) overview
information about the WSN device resources (e.g.,
hardware configuration, communication capabilities,
sensors available, tasks supported). The application
controller must also keep track of the tasks allocated to
each device.
The security controller encompasses two main
functions: node admission, and key distribution (or
generation, depending on the approach). Node
admission is related to accepting a device to participate
in the network, i.e., the device should be able to take
part in southbound, neighbor discovery and controller
discovery protocols, as described in Section 4.1. Another
level of node admission could be related to the
middleware used or a specific application using the WSN
services.
Key distribution is necessary in order to establish
a secure communication channel between nodes and
controllers (i.e., to support the control plane), or between
nodes and WSN sink, or between nodes (in both cases
to support the data plane). The secure communication
channel could provide confidentiality, integrity and/or
authenticity to the message exchanged. This security can
be achieved using symmetric algorithms (in which case
both ends should share the same key), or asymmetric
algorithms (in which case nodes must exchange public
keys). The selection of the algorithms depends on the
platform capabilities and the security level required (e.g.,
128-bit security).
The WSN devices should include support for the
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SDN protocols on the selected SDWSN framework,
the application middleware, and security algorithms to
achieve the security functionalities.
The WSN sink receives data from a specific
application configured on the application server. It does
not have to be controlled by the same entity that controls
the SSaaS framework, but it needs to be admitted in the
infrastructure. It also should be compatible with the
midleware used by the application controller, since it
will receive data collected.
3.2 Requirements
The SSaaS framework requirements are related
to infrastructure and security characteristics. The
infrastructure requirements are as follows.
• Communication: routing is achieved through an
SDN-based approach, which relies on the SDN
controller to: (i) receive neighbor information
from the SDN-enabled devices, (ii) build a global
topology map, and (iii) set routes (or flows) on the
SDN-enabled devices.
• Node programming and retasking: a middleware
able to address node task programming and
retasking is necessary. The user interacts with
the application controller to select the WSN nodes
it would like to program and the corresponding
tasks. Then, the application controller uses the
middleware to configure the WSN nodes.
• Resource database: the SSaaS framework,
by itself or by coordinating the SDN-based
approach and the middleware databases, must store
and manage information about: (i) the WSN
device resources (e.g., hardware configuration,
communication capabilities, sensors available,
tasks supported); (ii) the tasks allocated to each
device; (iii) the routes (or flows) set up; (iv) the
existing WSN sinks. It is also relevant to obtain
network and devices statistics, in order to balance
resources usage.
• WSN devices and sinks: should support the
protocols and mechanisms selected for the
infrastructure.
We can organize the security requirements in three
main categories:
• Security services: should include confidentiality,
authenticity and integrity. These services should be
available to the control messages being exchanged,
as well as support application that requires such
services. To achieve such services, we need
the algorithms implemented on the devices. If
symmetric algorithms are selected, which are
usually lightweight and require less resources, than
we need some approach to determine the shared
keys.
• Node admission: depending on the infrastructure
requirements, only authenticated nodes should have
access to the communication infrastructure. Thus,
node admission should enable the key exchange
mechanisms. Furthermore, it is necessary to
determine how a given node will be authenticated.
• Long-term security: could be achieved through
post-quantum (i.e. quantum-resistant) algorithms.
Thus, it is important to select such algorithms,
which should be securely implemented.
3.3 Assumptions
We assume that the controllers in our system are trusted
entities, i.e., they will not impersonate other devices
and they will share symmetric keys with authorized
nodes only. Therefore the implementation of the security
mechanisms, as well as the protocols and softwares,
must be secure so that it is not possible to compromise
an authentic controller. Furthermore, messages and
key exchange with controllers should make use of
mechanisms to assure authenticity. Thus it would not
be possible that an attacker impersonates a controller on
the network.
We consider that the communication between nodes
and controllers uses wireless media, and thus it could
be eavesdropped. Node deployment may be planned
by one entity and carried out by another entity. Node
admission criteria (or access control policy) is out of
the scope of this work, but it is relevant to determine
which devices could take part in the communication and
sensing infrastructure.
4 IMPLEMENTATION
In this section we discuss the approaches and
mechanisms to comply with the requirements described
previously. We introduce and discuss the SDN approach
for WSN and IoT communication, followed by the WSN
programming and network management. The security
topics are discussed next.
4.1 SDWSN framework
IT-SDN [1] is an SDWSN (Software Defined Wireless
Sensor Networks) tool that is completely open and
available. Its design is inspired by TinySDN [8],
but we improved the architecture, protocols and
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Figure 2: SDWSN architecture [1]
implementation. When designing IT-SDN, we consider
that the SDWSN architecture contains three main
communication protocols: southbound (SB), neighbor
discovery (ND) and controller discovery (CD), as
illustrated in Figure 2. The SB protocol is used for
the communication between controller and SDN-enabled
devices. It defines the packet format, how these packets
are processed and the state machine. The ND protocol
is used to obtain and maintain node neighborhood
information. Lastly, the CD protocol identifies a next
hop candidate to reach the controller.
IT-SDN underlying architecture is independent of
the operating system and its functions, and this is
key to enable interoperability. Also, IT-SDN defines
a clear separation of the protocols used to achieve
SB, ND, and CD, and this creates the environment to
evaluate new protocols to achieve these tasks depending
on the network characteristics. Furthermore, IT-SDN
implementation supports configuring multiple nodes
with a single packet, a feature that was envisioned in
previous work but has not been implemented [8, 10].
Figure 3 depicts the message exchange between an
SDWSN node and the controller. Once the controller
knows its neighbors (i.e., it has received neighbor report
messages), it has a partial topology view and is able to
send flow setup messages. When a node receives a flow
setup message, it will reply with a neighbor report, which
will improve the controller network view. When a node
receives a packet for which it does not have a matching
rule on its flow table, it sends a flow setup request to the
controller. After receiving the flow setup message, the
node is be able to process such packet.
IT-SDN Performance Evaluation
In order to evaluate IT-SDN performance we used
COOJA [28], a WSN node emulator with integrated
radio medium simulation. We selected DGRM (Directed
Graph Radio Medium) to control the network topology.
We chose the TelosB device as the basis of our
simulations. The scenario includes a controller running
on a PC, which communicates with the emulated
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Figure 3: IT-SDN message exchange [1]
network through “Serial Server” COOJA plugin, and was
positioned in the corner of the square grid topology.
One node was set as the data sink, and regular nodes
transmitted data towards the sink at 1 packet/min. The
network size ranged from 9 to 25 nodes. The following
metrics are assessed: (1) delivery, (2) delay, and (3)
control overhead. Each scenario was simulated 20 times
for 30 minutes, in order to obtain statistical significance.
Delivery rate is defined as the end-to-end delivery
ratio. For the results depicted in Figure 4, we consider
all the attempted transmissions, including message
retransmissions for control messages. For instance, if
a control message needs to be transmitted twice the
delivery rate would be 50%. In this case, the delivery
rate is near 100% for the network with 9 nodes, and
decreases to around 65% in larger networks (25 nodes).
Since the number of nodes generating data increases and
the number of hops to be traversed increases as well,
it is reasonable to see the decrease in the data delivery
rate. Figure 5 depicts results for delivery rate excluding
control message retransmissions. For larger networks,
we notice an increase in the control message delivery
rate.
Delay is defined as the time a packet takes to reach
its final destination (including queue time, and route
request-response delay). Control packets delay are not
significantly affected by the increase in the network size,
as illustrated in Figure 6. On the other hand, data packet
delay increases with the network size, what is reasonable
since the number of hops that must be traversed to
reach the sink increases. Control overhead, depicted in
Figure 7, is given by the total number of non-data packets
transmitted per node per minute. A control packet
retransmission is processed as a new packet transmission
for metric calculation purposes.
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4.2 WSN Programming and Management
WSN application development and resource
management are still complex tasks. The diversity
of resource constrained platforms and network
protocols demands specialized knowledge and practice.
Furthermore, once nodes are deployed software updates
and node reprogramming depend on specific features
already available on operating systems or software
running on the devices.
We selected to use WARM (WSN Application
development and Resource Management). WARM [32]
is a framework that employs Web Service and
Software Defined Networking paradigms to enable the
parametrized scheduling of tasks. It allows the user to
configure typical applications running on a simulated
WSN using a web browser.
WARM is based on the concept of application tasks,
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Figure 7: Overhead
which are hardware dependent routines whose instances
can be scheduled in sensor nodes. These routines
should implement lightweight processing algorithms,
environmental sensing or actuator actions, each one
representing a different capability of a sensor node.
Furthermore, they can also make use of the provided
SDN-based IEEE 802.15.4 stack in order to receive input
data from other tasks or to send their output data as input
for other tasks through the sensor network.
4.3 Security
To achieve the requirements identified, we need to
employ security algorithms. Symmetric algorithms
are more efficient in terms of resources necessary
(i.e., processing, memory, energy, message sizes).
However, in order to use such algorithms, we need
to achieve key exchange or distribution, as discussed
before (Section 2.2). To address the long-term
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Table 1: Comparison of parameter sizes (in bytes)
with various post-quantum signature schemes at the
quantum 128-bit security level (Based on [34], with
added information)
Scheme Public Private Signature
key size key size size
Hash-based 1056 1088 41000
Code-based 192192 1400288 370
Lattice
NTRU MLS 886 831 50
BLISS 7168 2048 5120
Tesla# 7168 4608 3488
Multivariate 99100 74000 424
Isogeny 768 48 141312
Compressed 336 48 122880
ECC (non PQ) 32 32
security requirement, we should select post-quantum
cryptography to achieve key distribution or exchange [5].
Post-Quantum Security
Post-quantum cryptography refers to cryptographic
algorithms that are thought to be secure against an attack
by a quantum computer. The public-key algorithms can
be organized in the following classes: (1) lattice-based
(2) multivariate (3) hash-based (4) code-based and (5)
supersingular elliptic curve isogeny cryptography.
While some authors argue that ECC algorithms
provide the necessary security level for nowadays,
we should consider long-term security since deployed
algorithms are not be replaced easily. Furthermore,
quantum computers are not far from reality given
IBM’s and Google’s recent announcements2. Also the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
has published a report on the subject [4], and is
now accepting submissions for quantum-resistant public-
key cryptographic algorithms. Despite the threat of
quantum computers, the integration of the quantum-
resistant cryptographic algorithms (i.e., the so called
post-quantum cryptography) [5] in the context of WSN
has not been widely discussed before.
Post-quantum protection can be employed in different
security operations, such as encryption, decryption
and signature schemes. Yoo et al. [34] provide a
comparison of parameter sizes (in bytes) with different
post-quantum signature schemes at the quantum 128-bit
security level, which is depicted in Table 1. The post-
quantum signature schemes are: stateless hash-based
signature SPHINCS-256, a code-based signature based
2 MIT Technology Review written by Tom Simonite on April 21, 2017.
Available at https://goo.gl/DIyB4X.
Table 2: Comparison of number of messages to
transmit a signature using IEEE 802.15.4 payload
and amount of memory to store public keys (in bytes)
with various post-quantum signature schemes at the
quantum 128-bit security level
Scheme Number of Memory to store 10
Messages Public Keys (in bytes)
Hash-based 410 10,560
Code-based 4 1,921,920
Lattice
NTRU MLS 1 8,860
BLISS 52 71,680
Tesla# 35 71,680
Multivariate 5 991,000
Isogeny 1,414 7,680
Compressed 1,229 3,360
on Niederreiters variant of the McEliece cryptosystem,
a lattice-based signature BLISS, a ring-LWE-based
signature TESLA#, the multivariate polynomial-based
Rainbow signature, and the isogeny-based scheme and
its compressed version proposed [34]. We also included
in the table the results we obtained for NTRU MLS, a
lattice-based signature scheme, identified by the set of
parameters xxx-20151024-443 3, as well as the non post-
quantum algorithm ECC for reference purposes.
Given resource constrained devices we consider for
WSN and IoT, it is important that the algorithms
require a low memory footprint to store the keys and
a small amount of data to be transmitted (public keys
and signatures). Typical WSN constrained devices are
characterized by small memory capacity, such as 10 KB
of RAM and 48 KB of programmable flash memory of
the TelosB [25]. Thus, key sizes of kilobytes are not
feasible for such devices, since, besides storing their own
pair of keys (public and private), nodes should store the
public keys of nodes they must exchange information
with.
The IEEE 802.15.4 standard [14] has a 127-byte
frame size, which must include the its own headers
as well as the information from upper layers. Thus a
signature from a code-based scheme is attractive, since
it would require about 4 messages to be transmitted.
On the other hand, transmitting a code-based public key
would require about 1,900 messages, thus making this
scheme unsuitable to such environments. Therefore it
is important to select an algorithm whose public key
and signature sizes provide a good balance in terms of
amount of messages transmitted.
Table 2 depicts the number of messages to transmit
3 Results from EISEC/TUM implementation.
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Figure 8: Infrastructure usage with one sink
a signature using the IEEE 802.15.4 payload (around
100 bytes), as well as the amount of memory necessary
to store ten public keys (in bytes) with the post-
quantum signature schemes depicted in Table 1. For this
comparison, we considered that the devices would need
to store 10 public keys, which would be the public key
from the controllers and other nodes with which they
would exchange data. Therefore, NTRU MLS is the
best option in terms of post-quantum algorithm, since it
achieves the best results in terms of number of messages
to be transmitted and amount of memory to store keys.
Another aspect that should be considered is the
execution time of such algorithms in resource
constrained platforms. For instance, considering
128-bit security level, NTRU Encryption takes 588,044
cycles to run in Cortex M0, while decryption takes
950,371 cycles [12]. Since the Cortex M0 runs at 32
MHz, it would take about 18 ms to encrypt and 30 ms
to decrypt, which is comparable to the time it takes to
obtain a temperature reading on the SensorTag device
(25 ms) [31].
5 SSAAS USE CASE
Usually, WSN nodes are considered disposable and
cheap devices, which could be deployed for a specific
task [7]. This is not the case in a smart city
scenario, where sensor nodes should collect, process and
transmit different types of data for different applications
Figure 9: Infrastructure sharing with different sinks
(e.g. environmental monitoring, traffic monitoring and
control, surveillance). If these sensor nodes and other
devices collecting data could be managed by the SSaaS
framework, one could achieve a much better usage of the
underlying infrastructure.
The SSaaS framework benefits from the SDN
paradigm centralized view of the network, which enables
node and resource management. Furthermore, the
SSaaS manager could use the energy available in a
given node (or set of nodes) or the security trust to
determine different weights on the topology graph, and
make the SDN controller select routes that will provide
the best network lifetime or the most secure path.
Based on information from the application controller
concerning the WSN application requirements, the
SSaaS manager could make the SDN controller select
different parameters to determine the route used by each
application flow.
Furthermore, the SSaaS manager could request the
application controller to relocate certain tasks, in order
to process more user’s requests. For instance, consider
the following situation. Application A is collecting data
and sending it to WSN sink A, as depicted in Figure 8.
Then application B is instantiated to collect and send
data to WSN sink B. If routes are reused, this could lead
to node 02 energy depletion before other nodes. Thus it
is better to create different routes, in order to balance the
energy consumption, as shown in Figure 9.
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6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a secure SDN-based
framework, Secure Sensing as a Service (SSaaS)
framework, which includes: communication protocols,
node task programming middleware, communication
and computation resource management features and
security services. The communication layer for the
constrained devices considers IT-SDN as its basis.
We include novel performance evaluation results from
IT-SDN, assessing: delivery rate, delay, and control
overhead.
Concerning security, we address the main services, the
type of algorithms to achieve them, and how their secure
implementation is needed to avoid attacks. Furthermore,
we discuss how to employ post-quantum algorithms in
our framework.
We are currently working on the integration of the
components, and next we will evaluate its overall
performance. In the future, we plan to execute the
SSaaS framework on our testbed at the USP, with nodes
deployed throughout the building.
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